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RÉSUMÉ
Cette présentation examinera le degré de certitude qui peut être atteint dans le domaine 
scientifique. Le paradigme scientifique est composé de deux extrêmes; causalité et déterminisme
d'un côté et probabilité et indéterminisme de l'autre. En faisant appel aux notions de Hume de la 
ressemblance et la contiguïté, on peut rejeter la causalité ou le hasard objectif comme étant sans 
fondement et non empirique. Le problème de l'induction et le sophisme du parieur proviennent 
d’une même source cognitif / heuristique. Hume décrit ces tendances mentales dans ses essais
« Of Probability » et « Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion ». Une discussion sur la conception 
de la probabilité de Hume ainsi que d'autres interprétations de probabilité sera nécessaire.
Même si la science glorifie et idéalise la causalité, la probabilité peut être comprise comme étant 
tout aussi cohérente. Une attitude probabiliste, même si elle est également non empirique, 
pourrait être plus avantageuse que le vieux paradigme de la causalité.
Mots clés: philosophie, probabilité, David Hume, Pierre Simon de Laplace, incertitude, le 
sophisme du parieur, induction, hasard, causalité, science.
ABSTRACT
This presentation examines the degree of certainty which can be attained in science. The 
scientific paradigm is composed of two extremes; causality and determinism on one end and 
probability and indeterminism on the other. By appealing to Hume’s notions of resemblance and 
contiguity, we can dismiss any claim of objective causality or chance as being ungrounded for 
lack of an empirical basis. The problem of induction as well as the gambler’s fallacy stem from 
the same cognitive/heuristic source. Hume describes these mental tendencies in his essays ‘Of 
Probability’ and ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion’. This will necessitate a discussion of 
Hume’s notion of probability, as well as other interpretations of probability. While science has 
glorified and romanticized causality, probability can be understood as being just as consistent. 
While a probabilistic stance is as non-empirical as a causal stance, it will be remarked that we 
may benefit from a paradigmatic switch to probabilism.
Key words: Philosophy, Probability, David Hume, Pierre Simon de Laplace, Uncertainty, 
Gambler’s Fallacy, Induction, Chance, Causality, Science.
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Excerpt from the movie CASINO (1995)
ACE and GREEN are seated having coffee and muffins in the Hawaiian lounge by the casino 
floor. 
ACE: Phil, I can understand. You're in the finances, you're upstairs, but you are not on the floor. 
I got thousands of players. I got five hundred dealers. They're all lookin' to rob me blind, twenty-
four hours a day. I have to let them know I'm watching all the details, all the time; that there is 
not one single thing I will not catch as I am over here. 
(Breaks open his blueberry muffin, puts it down and points to Green's.) Look at yours. 
GREEN: What? 
ACE: Look at that. Look at this. There's nothin' . . . look how many blueberries your muffin has 
and how many mine has. Yours is falling apart. I have nothing. 
GREEN: What are you talking about? 
ACE: It's like everything else in this place. You don't do it yourself, it never gets done. 
(GREEN follows ACE to the kitchen.) 
GREEN: Where you goin'?
ACE, GREEN and the BAKER are gathered around the BAKER's counter surrounded by muffin 
tins and batter.
ACE: (Handing the BAKER the two muffins) From now on I want you to put an equal amount 
of blueberries in each muffin. An equal amount of blueberries in each muffin.
BAKER: You know how long that's going to take? 
ACE: I don't care how long it takes. Put an equal amount in each muffin. 
(ACE leaves, GREEN looks on in amazement as the BAKER holds the muffins. GREEN follows 
ACE out.)
IV
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1 - Introduction
This unanswerable question has fascinated me for some time – is probability objective or 
subjective? Many great philosophical debates hinge on the answer to this question. Is our 
universe determinate or indeterminate? Is causality real or a heuristic device found in the mind? 
Even the question of free-will hinges on the notion of probability. The ontological question of
probability is a metaphysical question; any attempt to answer it would be purely conjectural.
This question, it appears, is unanswerable because probability, insofar as it is a tool that enables 
us to quantize uncertainty, is itself subject to the very uncertainty it aims to measure. It will be 
concluded that uncertainty must be regarded as a permanent feature of the epistemic landscape
by virtue of our inability to establish an objective foundation for either causality or probability.
This question, although unanswerable, is extremely insightful. To extract this insight, we 
can convert this fantastic metaphysical question into an epistemological question. The question 
then becomes; what degree of certainty can scientific knowledge attain? As an ontological
question it is speculative but as an epistemological question, it poses a direct challenge. The 
former sought to answer what we do not know whereas the latter seeks to question what we think 
we do know. As we confront this challenge we will need to examine further questions such as; 
‘what is meaning of ‘certainty’ in science?’, ‘what is the relationship between probability and 
causality?’, and ‘how are we to interpret probability and understand its place in science?’ Our 
attention consequently moves away from cosmological debates concerning determinism and 
freewill and turns to practical questions such as these - is it possible to know with precision the 
electron configuration in a single atom, or the blueberry distribution in a muffin batter?
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2 – Causality, Probability, Certainty and Knowledge
On either end of the scientific spectrum, we find causality and probability. These notions 
of causality and probability can be viewed as antagonistic terms. This is true in a sense; an event
is said to be caused insofar as it has necessarily occurred by way of some effect. Exactly the 
opposite is true for an event which is deemed probabilistic or stochastic; an event occurring by 
‘chance’, without prior determinants. This polarity is especially apparent in the domain of 
physics where classical mechanics is found on one side of the coin and quantum mechanics on 
the flipside. Deterministic laws best describe the motions of, and causal interactions between,
macroscopic bodies whereas the realm of microscopic phenomena is best understood in 
probabilistic terms. In this sense, causality and probability both have a rightful yet mutual 
exclusive place in science. In another sense, causality and probability are complementary 
concepts, both of which help us map out our knowledge. In this latter sense they work together 
as brick and mortar in building up and solidifying our epistemic edifice. In either sense, both
causality and probability carry with them their respective limits. Beyond these limits, there is 
only uncertainty. The bulk of this paper will be consecrated to the exploration of these limits.
Epistemologically speaking, one does not start with certainty in hand (unless one purports
knowledge through revelation). Certainty is something one must attain. Thus, at the point of 
departure in his epistemic journey, the scientist is completely lost, confused and perplexed. He
has to slowly sift through the dust, piecing together the bits as he painstakingly tries to decipher
who he is, where he is and what’s up. At the start of the epistemic journey, the scientist is the 
individual with amnesia - he knows nothing. This tragic flaw may turn out to play to his 
advantage. He builds up and refines what little he can know and gradually makes his way from 
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the known into ever further recesses of the unknown. The scientific paradigm, to paint a simple 
portrait, expands on what is known and extends into that which is not yet known.
Certainty and uncertainty are features of knowledge. Uncertainty is not a property of 
what is ‘unknown’ but rather of that which is ‘known’. Probability is a tool that enables us to 
quantitatively gauge our uncertainty and to extract useful information from what would 
otherwise be ostensible randomness and chaos. 
The body of scientific knowledge is analogous to an island amidst a vast ocean 
representing what is unknown. The highest and most central point in this island should naturally 
represent what we know with the highest degree of certainty. All talk of causality, being akin to 
virtual certainty, can be seen as the central and highest point of the island. We should expect 
physics to occupy this privileged position. This pinnacle would be the ideal point from which to 
view and map the entire island. As we approach the coastline of this island, the subject matter is 
intrinsically of a lesser degree of certainty. Upon our descent we may traverse statistical 
mechanics, followed perhaps by chemistry, biology, and then such fields of inquiry as the 
statistical or human sciences. Lastly we reach the shoreline itself, the furthest point from the 
pinnacle, where probability acts as a veritable buffer between what is unknown and what is 
uncertain. If probability cannot get us any closer to certainty, at the very least, it is apt to deal 
with, and help us understand, uncertainty. If for no other reason, this alone is sufficient to give it 
an advantage over the causal paradigm, which has dominated the landscape of the modern 
scientific paradigm.
Physics is adorned precisely because causal knowledge represents the highest form 
knowledge. In this schema, all fields of scientific enquiry are subordinate to the laws decreed by 
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physics. Causality is at the center, it is surrounded by probability which acts as a buffer of 
uncertainty. On this island of scientific knowledge, probability is understood as a purely 
epistemic concept. Causality and probability (as epistemic/subjective) go hand in hand. Where a 
causal nexus denotes the position or ‘known’ connections in the occurrence of a given 
phenomenon, epistemic probability denotes the negative or ‘secret and hidden’ connections in 
the occurrence of that same phenomenon. Epistemic probability is a gauge of our expectation of 
the occurrence of a given phenomena based on our ignorance of the true causes. 
A scientist who does not understand the role of probability in this epistemic landscape, or 
views probability as something that ought to be overcome, would like to fancy himself detached, 
on an island with no shoreline whatsoever. This island floats above the great sea of the unknown 
as though ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ were perfectly distinct from one another without admitting or 
requiring a buffer between the two. With an outright denial of uncertainty he proceeds to build
his castle in the sky. The misunderstanding arises from an unwarranted hasty jump from an 
epistemic project (empirical observation) to grand ontological claims concerning the underlying 
state of affairs (the primacy of causation). This unwarranted leap from epistemic inquiry to 
broader metaphysical claims will be the crux of David Hume’s argument against causality.
A scientist who is utterly convinced that everything can be understood, and ultimately 
explained, via causal connections may view uncertainty as a sort of undesirable static which 
impedes a pristine perception of the world. Uncertainty, viewed in this light, is something that
ought to gradually be eliminated altogether. Like a lingering stain which is observed anew after 
each consecutive wash, it remains after each attempt by the scientist to reduce its effects on his
observations and measurements. This residual property of uncertainty makes it ever more 
detestable. As for the scientist who does not rigidly adhere to the causal paradigm, uncertainty 
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may be viewed as a permanent feature of the epistemic landscape.  In accepting it as such, this 
scientist does not look upon it harshly nor will he view himself as any less of a scientist for it. In 
accepting uncertainty as such, is he forsaking the full potential of the scientific project?
There may be another way of envisaging this body of scientific knowledge altogether, in 
which probability plays a more pivotal role. One can imagine an island where uncertainty not 
only acts as a buffer between ‘certain’ knowledge and the unknown, but where uncertainty forms
the very foundation or bedrock of the island itself. Here probability is not merely an epistemic
feature but a metaphysical feature of the underlying state of affairs, thus taking on the same
metaphysical preeminence of causality in the previous schema. In this schema, all fields of 
scientific enquiry, not excluding classical physics, are subject to a fundamental and irreducible 
degree of uncertainty. Regardless of the role that probability is made to play, whether simply 
epistemic or as a more integral part of the state of affairs, the probabilistic paradigm is as 
congruent as the causal paradigm in both its description of the world and in its predictive power.
The difficult arises from our ignorance concerning that which is taking place beyond the 
event horizon of our experience. What does the underlying state of affairs resemble beyond the 
limits of empiricism (the limits of science)? We do not know what lays behind-the-scenes in this 
buffer zone named ‘uncertainty’. One can ask the rather bizarre question - what is ‘uncertainty’ 
made of? Compelled by curiosity, we want to know, and our intellectual appetite is not easily
satisfied with the posture that we fundamentally cannot know. We feel uncomfortable with this 
because we intuit that there must be something, and not merely nothing, taking place beyond the 
horizon of our experience (lest we should revert back to Bishop Berkeley’s subjective idealism).
Hence, the belief is that if we probe deep enough, we will unearth causes which were previously 
hidden. We will crack uncertainty open, so to speak, to see what is inside. This is, of course, the 
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leading view which has dominated the epistemic landscape of science for some time. Alternately, 
one can proclaim that there is not causality but rather that probability is the metaphysical 
grounds of ultimate physical reality. Furthermore, the mind is tempted to assert that one of these
two alternately must be the state of affairs. The problem is that we have, upon close examination, 
no empirical basis for either stance. Would the best course of action not be to dismiss both as 
metaphysical nonsense? Admitting this would be equivalent to stating that one cannot get at the 
true state of affairs regardless how deep one digs. If we admit this, we are admitting that neither 
causality nor probability have an objective reality. Uncertainty grows out of the failure of these 
physical paradigms (the former causal paradigm as well as the newly emerging probabilistic 
paradigm) to depict the underlying state of affairs in such a manner as to eliminate any room for 
reasonable doubt. Uncertain is not merely a horizon in our experience but a veritable epistemic 
‘event-horizon’. Uncertainty does have an objective reality, but one akin to a black hole insofar 
as it manifests its reality in a purely negative manner. Furthermore, and perhaps surprisingly, this 
holds even without prescribing a metaphysical primacy to probability.
Ultimately, the task at hand consists in answering this question; can we conceive of an 
objective uncertainty without any additional metaphysical quality. This is a two-fold task. The 
first task will be to undermine the notion of causality by appealing to probability. The second 
task will then be to undermine probability by demonstrate that regardless of the interpretation of 
probability, that uncertainty is an objective feature of knowledge. I intend to demonstrate that the 
idea of an attainable absolute certainty, once fantasized by science, is a phantasm. Uncertainty 
alone is real, it is inevitable and irreducible – it is something that cannot be avoided. We will 
explore the cognitive mechanisms and fallacies, namely the gambler’s fallacy and the problem of 
induction, which have led people to perceive certainty where there may only be uncertainty.
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3 – Rethinking Causality: Hume, Of Probability, and the Gambler’s Fallacy
It is the business of philosophy to keep alive those unanswerable ‘ultimate questions’1
while keeping the debates that envelope them sound. The first task, then, of philosophy consists 
of keeping alive our sense of what is possible; not in the sense of fiction or fantasy but in the 
sense which stems from reason (reasonable doubt) and critical thought. To do this, the 
philosopher is required to distinguish what we know (with certainty) and what we still do not 
know from what we cannot know (i.e., classical metaphysics). There have, however, been 
instances in the history of science where we thought we knew, but on further examination (or re-
examination of many centuries of unilateral thought), our knowledge was not as grounded as we 
had triumphantly presented it to be. Such circumstances of pretentious wisdom put us at a greater 
disadvantage then if we neither knew nor thought that we knew (remembering Socrates in the
Apology). It is for this reason that philosophy performs the second critical task of keeping the 
edifice of human knowledge (i.e., the sciences) in check. This will be my primary focus.
David Hume may be regarded as one such philosopher who excels at both tasks; sparking 
our sense of wonder and possibility whilst shaking us out of our ‘dogmatic slumber’. Essays such 
as ‘Of Probability’ and ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion’ from An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding are a testament to this. His short essay entitled ‘Of Probability’ will form 
the base for this presentation. In this essay, Hume will focus on the tendency in the mind to 
disproportionately favor, and often to take as law-like and necessary, events with a heightened 
probability of occurrence. This immediately precedes and reinforces Hume’s subsequent attacks 
on induction and causality in ‘Of the idea of Necessary Connexion’. Although this famous 
critique of inductive reasoning and causality follow from his analysis of probability, the latter 
                                                          
1
See Bertrand Russell ‘The Problems of Philosophy’ p.1
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has received far less attention2. We will explore Hume’s idea on probability as well as other 
philosophical interpretations of probability.
The idea of a world being causally determined is romanticized by science. Certainty, in 
this romanticized clock-work universe, comes to mean precisely this; foreknowledge of all 
causes leading to an effect whereby the non-occurrence of that effect is inconceivable. The 
scientific utopia consists of absolute certainty in which all phenomena can be foreseen and 
explained via an extremely intricate, yet knowable, causal nexus. It is for this reason that I will 
briefly suggest that we may benefit from a break from our current Newtonian paradigm to adopt 
a probabilistic world view. This paradigmatic swap may benefit people such as Sam ‘Ace’ 
Rothstein from the film ‘Casino’, who rampantly desire certainty where there may only be 
uncertainty, in understanding why his blueberry muffin is devoid of blueberries.
3.1 - The Gambler’s Fallacy: The fallacies by which we perceive an order out of randomness
It is important to note that Hume does not believe in chance or causality. In the opening 
passage in ‘Of Probability’ he says, ‘Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our 
ignorance of the real causes of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and 
begets a like species of belief or opinion’3. From this passage, one might assume that Hume is 
advocating determinism in a similar manner to Pierre-Simon Laplace, French astronomer and 
mathematician. In view of determinism, probability is interpreted as an epistemic notion 
pertaining to our ‘ignorance of the real causes’. In the subsequent essay ‘Of the Idea of 
Necessary Connexion’, Hume argues against causality as well. He advocates neither determinism 
nor indeterminism as he constantly exhibiting a skeptical demeanor.
                                                          
2 Hume on Probability. Gower (1991), p.2,3 as well as Hume’s Species of Probability. Hacking (1978) p.22
3 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p.37
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Regardless of this skeptical position, Hume presents ideas in his short essay ‘Of
Probability’ that are simple yet highly informative in regards to how our minds formulate 
expectations about the outcome of future events on the basis of very restricted past experience. 
These mechanisms describe the mind a gambler in committing the ‘gambler’s fallacy’. Such 
mechanisms do not apply exclusively to the gambler or to games of chance; they may express the 
mental tendency of anyone seeking to extrapolate patterns from past instances with the wish to 
make future instances more predictable. In its most extreme form, this fallacy generates ideas of 
law and necessity – this is precisely the case with the idea of causality or ‘necessary connexion’.
To understand was is meant by the Gambler’s fallacy, we will use Pierre-Simon 
Laplace’s example of the betting tendencies he observed in the French lottery. He observes,
Lorsqu’à la loterie de France un numéro n’est pas sorti depuis longtemps, la foule 
s’empresse de le couvrir de mises. Elle juge que le numéro resté longtemps sans 
sortir doit, au prochain tirage, sortir de préférence aux autres… Par une illusion 
contraire aux précédentes, on cherche dans les tirages passés de la loterie de 
France les numéros le plus souvent sortis, pour en former des combinaisons sur 
lesquelles on croit placer sa mise avec avantage. Mais vu la manière dont le 
mélange des numéros se fait à cette loterie, le passé ne doit avoir sur l’avenir 
aucune influence.4
We can define the Gambler’s fallacy as the mistaken belief that prior observed instances 
have a bearing on the outcome of subsequent instances within a system whose outcomes are 
mutually independent. Laplace illustrates such a system with the use of the national lottery in 
which, when the manner of ‘the mixing of the numbers is considered, the past ought to have no 
influence upon the future’.
There are two ways in which this ‘illusion’ takes form. Firstly, it manifests in the belief 
that a given event is ‘due’ or ‘bound’ to occur on the grounds that it has not occurred in recent
                                                          
4
Essai philosophique sur les probabilités, p. 199, 202
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instances. This is also known as the ‘doctrine of the maturity of the chances’ or the ‘Monte-Carlo 
fallacy’ due to the famous streak of 26 consecutive black numbers at a Monte Carlo roulette table 
in 1913 which engendered a betting frenzy on red well before the black streak came to an end.
Secondly, this fallacy manifests in the belief that an event is more likely to occur on the grounds 
that it is on a ‘hot streak’ given that it has already occurred, with an inspiring frequency, in 
recently observed instances. An unwarranted inference results from this skewed line of reasoning.
It is precisely in this second sense that Hume is inviting us to envision the problem of 
induction – especially pertaining to causality. According to Hume, there exists a strong tendency 
in the mind to favor highly probable outcomes and, if the probability of their occurrence is high 
enough, to take their occurrence as ‘necessary’. Simply stated, when the mind has observed two 
events in constant conjunction, it then tends to form an idea of a ‘necessary connexion’ between 
the two events. As a result of this tendency, an event with a low order of occurrence is viewed as 
a discrepancy or an anomaly, as opposed to being accounted for in probabilistic terms. What 
arises from this is a scientific paradigm founded on determinism and law-like necessity which 
then rationalizes away, with ever greater vigor, phenomena of ever lower probability. 
Why is the gambler’s fallacy significant to scientific justification? It possesses the danger 
of an unwarranted expectation that the world will present itself in a certain way; as one expects 
to find it based upon one’s own image of it and not the other way around as empiricism properly 
entails. When the world does not match this unwarranted expectation, the gambler (or scientist) 
seeks to explain this non-occurrence by alluding to something having gone wrong. He ought, 
instead, rightly justify his expectation in the first place – ‘what leads me to believe that it would 
occur?’ versus ‘why did it not occur?’ The former fits the hypothetical-deductive method 
whereas the latter does not. Thus, I am not suggesting that one should never seek-out ‘hide and 
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secret causes’, for to do so would be to suggest that chance is real. I am making no such 
ontological claim. Rather, I am suggesting is that accounting for events which do not readily 
adhere to a causal nexus by alluding to occult causes carries with it strong metaphysical 
undertones. Such an insistence is to apply a causal paradigm where it need not necessarily apply.
To illustrate this tendency to disproportionately favor, and often to take as law-like and 
necessary, an event with at heightened probability of occurrence, Hume asks us to imagine a six-
sided die ‘marked with one figure or spot on four sides, and with another figure or number of 
spots on the two remaining sides’. In our minds, we would naturally take these sides as equal and 
would ascribe that they are ‘equiprobable’. Given that there are four sides marked with a figure 
and only two sides marked otherwise, our minds would be led to expect the former to turn up 
more often than the latter5. Then suppose we have a die with one-thousand sides where 999 sides 
are similar and only one side is different. How should we expect our minds to formulate an 
expectancy of the ‘more favorable’ side to turn up? How would the mind perceive the likelihood 
of the singular side turning up? The probability assignment to a six-sided die seems more readily 
apparent to the mind than the probability assessment of a thousand-side die. Herein lays Hume’s 
unique contribution to our understanding, and use of, probability. Hume states clearly,
I would willingly establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, that 
when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such 
ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and 
vivacity.6
Hume describes the psychological connection between the observed facts in the world 
and the state of mind which arises in consequences to these observations. In this case, the
connection is seen between chance phenomena and the subjective beliefs formed about their 
                                                          
5  Enquiry, p. 37
6 A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 69
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expected frequency of occurrence. In the case of causality, this connection would be seen 
between an aggregate of ‘similar’ instances and the subjective tendency of the mind to move
from their ‘constant conjunction’ towards the formation of an idea of cause and effect.
Hume’s treatment of probability of ‘chances’ will gradually take us to his treatment of 
probability of ‘causes’ and finally to his treatment of ‘necessary connexion’. His treatment of 
causality can be understood as an extreme case of his treatment of probability. His attack on 
causality stems directly out of his ideas on probability. For Hume to attack the idea ‘necessary 
connexion’, being based on constant conjunction, he requires a theory of less-than-constant 
conjunction7. This is implicit in ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion’. Hacking suggests that
Hume did not explicitly spell it out because, as a member of the times, he was not ready to 
conceptually switch to a world of ontological probabilities8. The idea of the necessity of a cause 
is taken for granted, ‘without any proof given or demanded’ and is so deeply instilled, in Hume’s 
time as in ours, that it is ‘impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of’9.
Returning to the six-sided die that Hume has handed us, why should we grant that each 
side is ‘equiprobable’? Before we have accumulated observed experiences to rely upon, we 
naturally assume a sort of a priori probability wherein we take all outcomes as equally likely
wherever we have to reason to think otherwise; of one as being more likely than any other. Hume 
says “a perfect and total indifference is essential to chance, and one total indifference can never 
in itself be either superior or inferior to another'10. This is, in and of itself, in no way sufficient 
for the evaluation of probability because it is not based on anything except for our initial idea 
based on equiprobable outcomes. Hume tells us,
                                                          
7 Hacking, 1978, p. 24
8 Ibid
9 Treatise, p.56
10 Ibid, p.125
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When the mind looks forward to discover the event, which may result from the 
throw of such a die, it considers the turning up of each particular side as alike 
probable; and this is the very nature of chance, to render all particular events, 
comprehended in it, entirely equal.11
We then need to supplement our knowledge in order to arrive at a more reliable 
probability evaluation. The most readily available way is to base our knowledge on our 
experience. This is where observed facts of the world would begin to influence our subjective 
degrees of belief. Hume demonstrates that experience influences the mind in a very peculiar way.
It will here be worth our observation, that the past experience, on which all our 
judgments concerning cause and effect depend, may operate on our mind in such 
an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of, and may even in some 
measure be unknown to us.12
This interplay between observed facts and degrees of belief will be Hume’s unique 
contribution. The tendency of this mind to amalgamate our perceived experiences, itself goes 
unperceived in the process and its effect goes unnoticed. This interplay between observed facts 
and degrees of belief will prove fatal for the notion of causality as well as for any hope of ever
ascertaining a truly accurate probability valuation for any event whatsoever.
We assume, upon overlooking our six-side die, that any of its particular sides turning up 
after a toss is ‘alike probable’, based on our indifference (principle of indifference). We proceed 
                                                          
11 Enquiry, p.38
12 Treatise, p.72
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to toss the die, as part of a game or in hope of uncovering a potential bias in the die itself. The 
outcome of each toss leaves an impression on our mind.
After a series of tosses of this six-sided die, an on-looking spectator would be content to 
grant that the turning up of any side is as likely as any other. He would also grant that the next 
toss will be decided by chance (admitting no law or pattern which would ameliorate his
predictive power) unless he is highly prone to commit the gambler’s fallacy.
Upon returning to the question concerning the thousand-sided die, will the mind so 
readily cease the probability of the one lonesome side turning up versus any of the other nine-
hundred ninety-nine imposing and opposing sides? Hume describes our psychological propensity 
to give disproportionate ‘preference to that which has been found most usual’ in the case of a 
probabilistic event. Hume describes this process as follows:
Finding a greater number of sides concur in the one event than in the other, the 
mind is carried more frequently to that event, and meeting it oftener…begets 
immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and 
gives that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a smaller 
number of views, and recurs less frequently to the mind…The concurrence of these 
several views or glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination; 
gives it superior force and vigor; renders its influences on the passions and 
affections more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance and security, which 
constitutes the nature of belief and opinion.13
In Section VI ‘Of Probability’ from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
Hume says “Probability, which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and according 
as this superiority increases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a 
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proportional increase, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side, in which we 
discover the superiority”14.
This gradual change to the subjective degree of belief can be graphed as a function of
ever greater probabilities (with a marked divergence as probabilities approach 1). A true 
empiricists ought to adhere to the graph on the left; defining the probability of occurrence of 
events (i.e., temperature in January, breaking point of a material, etc.) in terms of their ratio of 
occurrence in sets of past observations (x-axis; empirical probability). We should expect that 
probability of the next round ought to be what we have experienced thus far. The graph on the 
right is skewed by the gambler’s fallacy and approaches infinity for tangent at 1. As the 
empirical probability of an event approaches 1, the belief in the occurrence of that event has 
already increased beyond its empirical value. This trend becomes ever more pronounced with 
ever greater values. Therefore when the empirical probability readily approaches 1, the mind is 
already convinced of the impossibility of the non-occurrence of that event; it hastily and falsely 
assumes a ‘necessary connexion’. This is the birth of the idea of law-like necessity in nature. 
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A coefficient could be added to the tangent function as a variable describing one’s
propensity to invoke the gambler’s fallacy. When this coefficient is equal to zero, the graph will 
resemble the one on the left. Beliefs are not biased by incoming information – therein lays the 
mind of the true empiricist. The greater the coefficient, the more hastily one will evoke the 
gambler’s fallacy and the greater is such a person’s propensity to disproportionately prefer the 
more likely outcomes. This can be expressed by a function of the form ݕ = ߛݔଷ+ ݔ ,     0 ≤  ߛ  
where ߛexpress the propensity to commit the gambler’s fallacy. That which seems trivial and 
even negligible with a two-sided coin (p=1/2) or a six-sided die (p=1/6), becomes
philosophically problematic as we approach extreme values of P, illustrating how the mind
schematizes the world its experiences. If the nuances of this line of thought are appreciated, this
underlying problem forces us to reconsider the very probability evaluation of the coin and the die.
Though an event may be highly probably, it should not be thought of as absolutely 
necessary either. This would mean that we have a hastened tendency to dismiss an event as being 
impossible while it may still possess a very low possibility of occurrence, or alternately, to 
assume that a specific effect is necessary  though it may only be highly probable. With regards to 
low orders of probability, this is precisely the tendency in the statistical or human sciences, to 
discard extreme data (especially when plotting a correlation). This tendency acts as a coat of 
varnish, making the data appear smoother – one might even say, more ‘natural’. Yet the data 
point is there, it represents an empirical measurement. This discarding of data, I would venture to 
guess, arises from nothing other than an inferiority complex within the statistical sciences which 
seek to become more rigorous or ‘real’ – like all those mathematical sciences, especially physics. 
Consequently, as we tend to valorize highly probable events, reciprocally, we have a 
tendency to rationalize, or utterly ignore, occurrence of a highly improbable nature. Hume says 
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“When any cause fails of producing its usual effect, philosophers ascribes not this to any 
irregularity in nature; but suppose that some secret causes, in the particular structure of parts, 
have prevented the operation”15. This is when we must exercise prudence lest we slide into 
dogmatism as this ‘great assurance’ that the past will transfer onto the future may eventually 
‘leave no room for any contrary supposition’16. This is especially true for occurrences of a very 
low order of probability which places them in heighten jeopardy of being rationalized away or 
dismissed. Thus, Hume warns us that this tendency may lead us to undermine less likely events 
thereby, jeopardizing the accuracy of our predictions for future events. He says,
Where different effects have been found to follow from causes, which are to 
appearance, exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to the mind in 
transferring the past to the future, and enter into consideration, when we 
determine the probability of an event. Though we give the preference to that which 
has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we must not 
overlook the other effects, but must assign to each of them a particular weight and 
authority, in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent.17
Notions like ‘necessary connexion’ which are supported by notions of ‘hidden and secret 
causes’, if unchecked, can lead to all kinds of ungrounded and unempirical ideas. This applies 
equally to notions like ‘chance’ which give rise to notions like ‘luck’ or ‘fortune’ – all of these 
notions exude a smell of the occult and of superstition. We revert to these notions just as one
would formerly revert to theological notions; for explanative power. When we want science to 
explain (as the former theological paradigms did) we compromise its true power – the power to 
account, to measure. Science cannot ultimately explain anything, it can only account, in the 
Baconian sense. According to Wesley Salmon, this view places me in an exceedingly scarce 
group of thinkers who believe that “scientific knowledge is descriptive- it tells us what and how. 
If we seek explanations- if we want to know why- we must go outside of science, perhaps to 
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metaphysics or theology”18. Why we can continue asking why is because the ‘why’ question, and 
that itching inside of us that wants it answered, is never ultimately satisfied – as a curious child 
may perpetually and systemically ask ‘why?’ after each of his parents’ proposed answers.  I, for 
one, think it is remarkable that this question ‘why?’ can never be answered. This is why 
Wittgenstein tells us that “we feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been 
answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched”19. Probability, if it cannot explain 
fringe phenomena by evoking non-empirical ideas of ‘hidden and secret causes’, can at least aid 
us in making more comprehensive measurements.
To illustrate this we can appeal to Salmon’s example of the occurrence of leukemia 
around the hypocenter of a nuclear blast20. If we adhere to a strict notion of causality, then
‘hidden and secret causes’ will be needed to account for illnesses at ever greater distances from 
the hypocenter of the blast. If we employ a probabilistic conception of causality, we can account 
for the occurrence of such an illness without needing to appeal to anything else beyond the
explosion itself. The definition of cause can be understood as bringing about a change to the 
probability distribution, or expectation, of a given event. James Woodward describes this as 
follows - “some intervention on X such that if it were to occur, then Y (or the probability of Y ) 
would change”21. This is in stark contrast to the application of an unempirical obsolete
conception of causality which relies on occult and obscure notions. In this manner, one can 
account for fringe occurrences, such as the probability of disease at many kilometers from a 
hypocenter of a nuclear blast, without evoking ‘secret and hidden’ causes. In this sense, to
account for or describe a given occurrence may be the limit of empirical reasoning – to seek 
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anything beyond this is to try to look beyond the horizon, a task that empirical reasoning is, by 
virtue of its own design, inapt to accomplish.
This tendency can also be explained with regards to the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy in 
which data is interpreted in such a way that relevant patterns appear. The idea is to picture a 
‘sharpshooter’ firing some shots into the side of a barn. He then walks over to the barn and paints
a target over the largest cluster of hole thereby making himself out to be a ‘sharpshooter’. If we 
leave aside conscious and intention manipulation of data, this fallacy points to the same 
unconscious cognitive mechanism which gives raise to the gambler’s fallacy, namely, the 
tendency to extrapolate or fabricate patterns out of randomness. This has also been called the 
‘cluster illusion’ in cognitive psychology.22 Hume’s attacks the process of induction, which in 
turn leads to ideas as causality, are directed to this hasty quality of induction to readily move 
from an epistemic project of accumulating data to metaphysical proclamation concerning the 
mechanics of production and propagation of the structure of the world. The data is selected 
which best suits the model, the model is not selected to best suit the data. A prescribed model of 
the world is generated within which everything is made to fit. This is where potential implicates 
for the sciences may arise.
The theory takes precedence over, and is defended at the cost of, observed data. What 
arises from this are instrumental scientific theories, such as the Ptolemaic model of astronomy. If 
contradictory evidence is found, the theory can simply accommodate just as the ‘sharpshooter’ 
can paint an extra ring around his target. Though such instrumental theories can account for pass 
observation, they relinquish all predictive power which is the hallmark of science. It is a function
of philosophy to insure that science does not regress back to a dogmatic state lest it will lose all 
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How we know what isn't so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life. Gilovich, Thomas (1991).
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its predictive power. This requires the philosophy of science to understand the intrinsic capability 
of the mind to erroneously observe and/or impose patterns when none exist. It also calls for the 
need to reexamine the causal paradigm as a potential yet paradoxical hindrance to the predictive 
power of science, that power which has set science apart from all other paradigms of knowledge.
The thousand-sided die has been a useful aid in understanding the mind’s tendency to 
amplify probability. To illustrate the philosophical problem thoroughly, let us suppose that the 
structure/ geometric properties of this die were kept hidden from us. If we only ever have access 
to the outcome of each individual throw of this die, but never to the die itself, how many throws 
of this die would be needed to generate an idea of its structure? If I had not initially informed 
you that the object in question had been a die (an object associated with chance), how long 
would it take (how many throws and subsequent outcomes) to conclude that you were, in fact, 
dealing with a die (an object of chance)? Alternately stated; being in the world as it is, how could 
you ever decide whether the world is determinate or indeterminate? Or; how can you ever know 
if ‘chance’ in objective (if God plays dice with the cosmos)? You can never know. Our scientist, 
lost on the island of scientific knowledge, how can he ever determine the ultimate foundation of 
that island? Furthermore, any assumption or purport to knowledge could rapidly influence the 
remainder of one’s investigation. 
The extent to which we can be certain of this die’s structure by means of an aggregate of 
throws is the extent to which we can have certainty in our empirical sciences. This is because all 
we have is a collection of instances (separate throws of the die). Such a collection, regardless of 
its magnitude, can never tell us anything absolute about the underlying structure of the object of 
inquiry, whether that item be a thousand-sided die or the world. We can never be sure of whether
we are dealing with a die governed by objective probability or an unwavering law-like generative 
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principle. It is impossible to know with absolute certainty the structure of this die, or if it is a die, 
as it is impossible to know that generative principle which governs ultimate physical reality.
Hume makes essentially the same argument when he reasons that nothing can be said about the 
idea of causality or ‘necessary connexion’ by means of an aggregate of instances.
3.2 - Hume on Probability
Hume formulates probabilities as a difference between ‘favorable’ versus ‘unfavorable’
chances. This is opposed to the conventional formulation whereby probabilities are expressed in 
terms of a fractional number between 0 and 1. Hume claims that 'the mind is determined to the 
superior only with that force, which remains after subtracting the inferior'23. It is the difference 
between, and not the ratio of, the number of observations favorable to a predicted effect and the 
number of observations unfavorable to it, which is the measure of probability24. For Hume, the 
'inferior…destroys the superior, so far as its strength goes’ thereby, the probability will be 
measured by the remaining strength of the ‘superior chances’25.
Hume might advise against yielding probability values between 0 and 1 by dividing the 
superior chances by the sum total of both the superior and inferior chances (ݏ ݏ+ )݅⁄ . 
Quantifying probabilities as fractional carries an implicit supposition that the total number of 
observations does not contribute to the probability assessments or degrees of belief.
Let us suppose two people are tallying the relative outcomes of a given phenomenon. In 
one hundred instances of this phenomenon, one person has observed the outcome x on ninety
times. The other person, having made just ten observations of the same phenomenon, has
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tabulated the occurrence of x nine times. The conventional formulation of probability will claim
that both people yield the same probability, namely, that outcome x results from this 
phenomenon with a probability of occurrence of p=0.9. Contrary to this, Hume suggests that 
though they have observed the same relative frequency, one person has observed x with a greater 
‘superiority’ which will have made a greater ‘impression’ on that person’s beliefs. Gower tells us:
Hume, as we have seen, wanted to subtract the ‘inferior’ number of observations 
from the ‘superior’ number in order to arrive at a probability, so he could not treat 
the ten-observation and the one-hundred-observation versions of the example as 
the same. Nor, it might be said on Hume’s behalf, should they be treated the same, 
for surely the absolute number of observations counts for something when a 
person ‘proportions his belief to the evidence’.26
Hume’s background as a lawyer may be seen here as influencing his conception of 
probability27. In a case where six witnesses testify against the testimony of two, the jury may be 
more compelled towards a given verdict than another jury faced with a similar case in which 
three witnesses testify against the testimony of one. This can be connected to what John Maynard 
Keynes will later refer to as ‘weight’, as in weighting the evidence, but what is meant by this
ought to be thought of as reliance as in statistical reliability. 
Hacking claims this to be the result of Hume skewing levels of probability28. This would 
infer that Hume conflates the idea of probability with confidence or reliability. Whereas the latter 
increases with an increased number of instances, the former does not – it stays the same. It 
appears that Hume does not make this distinction. Nevertheless, Hume is pointing to something 
which is of psychological relevance, and as for as mind is concerned, the latter does have a 
bearing on its evaluation of the former. A larger number of views, Hume asserts, have a bearing 
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on our degree of belief. This invites discourse for other possible variables which can influence a 
person’s degree of belief concerning outcomes of events. Hume points out that,
An experiment, that is recent and fresh in the memory, affects us more than one 
that is in some measure obliterated; and has a superior influence on the judgment, 
as well as on the passions. A lively impression produces more assurance than a 
faint one; because it has more original force to communicate to the related idea, 
which thereby acquires a greater force and vivacity. A recent observation has a like 
effect; because the custom and transition is there more entire, and preserves 
better the original force in the communication. 29
We can venture to imagine that time interval between events, and the magnitude of the event 
itself, may influence subjective beliefs. Suppose I lose three consecutive hands at blackjack, I 
may feel more cheated than if I had lost three consecutive plays at roulette betting on color. The 
odds of one game are exchangeable with that of the other; the only difference may be the time 
interval between each play. Supposing this time interval to be shorter in blackjack, I may more 
readily feel these losses versus similar losses at roulette. This would be an example of how time 
influences our degree of beliefs. Alternately, suppose that opium would not act as a soporific 1 
time in 10 and that Mount Vesuvius erupts, on average, once every 10 decades. The disbelief 
triggered by the volcanic eruption in any given decade would be disproportionately greater than
the disbelief generated by witnessing someone having taken opium and not having fallen asleep.
If philosophy is to keep a watchful eye over science, these mental tendencies must be well 
understood as they can easily bestow a subjective flavor to our observations.
3.3 - Hume’s attack Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion as an extension of Of Probability
Hume’s work on probability and belief formation extends into his famous critique of 
induction and causality in his essay ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion’. Our concept of 
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‘necessary connexion’ is only a feeling in the mind as it results from the same mental tendency. 
Hume directly asserts there are metaphysical ideas such as power, force, energy and necessary 
connexion whose definitions are shrouded in obscurity and uncertainty30. To this list, he should 
have added ‘chance’ which acts as a sort of antithesis to the idea of ‘necessary connexion’, being
just as obscure and difficult to define.
Hume is an empiricist. If all our ideas are taken to be ‘nothing but copies of our 
impressions’, then the cognitive faculties of the mind could not come to define an idea without
sensory experience31. When long habit is introduced, Hume warns that such impressions, like 
geometrical definitions, ‘compare ideas much wider of each other’ such that the mind no longer
evaluates individual circles but simply asserts ‘Circle!’ or ascribes ‘circle-ness’ on all 
occasions32. This tendency of the mind does not solely apply to properties of simple items or 
occurrence in our experience, but all facets of our experience including the temporal sequencing 
of occurrences themselves. The mind seems to have as aptitude for grouping seemingly similar 
elements of our experience and seeking out or imposing patterns. Hence, having witnessed one 
event temporally conjoined to another event on multiple occasions, and having witnessed these 
constantly conjoined, the mind begins to perceive these events as being necessarily conjoined; 
necessarily entailing one another on all occasions. Thus, the idea of ‘necessary connexion’ is 
formed, firstly by seeing similarity in separate instances, and then inferring from these ‘similar 
instance’ a pattern – in this case, causality.
We cannot, from a single observation, reasonably formulate ‘anything which can suggest 
the idea of power or necessary connexion’. Hume asserts that we cannot derive anything from a
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singular observation of two conjoined events that could suggest the existence of some unseen 
force which necessarily binds the two events33. He goes on to assert that it is equally not in our 
power to derive from any number of single instances anything which is beyond them. 
Furthermore, no pattern emerges out of an aggregate of single instances which cannot be derived 
from a single instance, and no such pattern can be derived from a single case, therefore no 
pattern can be found. Therefore, says Hume, ‘necessary connexion’ is inconceivable unless we
fathom that in one ‘species’ of event, or a number of similar events, having always been 
conjoined with another may allow the mind to conceive of ‘causal necessity’. Perhaps ‘causal 
necessity’ may develop if we examine an aggregate of similar instances as opposed to any 
singular instance. Hume denies this flatly:
It appears, then, that this idea of necessary connexion among events arises from a 
number of similar instances, which occur, of the constant conjunction of these 
event…but there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single 
instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a 
repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of 
one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe, that it will exist. This 
connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the 
imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, 
from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.34
We cannot derive ‘cause’ from a particular instance. Therefore what makes us think we 
can infer it from an aggregate of similar/uniform instances, as though some occult force or 
pattern would emerge? There is no objective difference between a singular and the aggregate 
sum of similar instances. Any difference is in the mind’s treatment of these and not anything to 
be found in, or derived from, the instances themselves. The only notable difference to be found 
in a collection of uniform instances is in the mind’s treatment of them - its own propensity to 
create an idea or impression of necessity. It is only after regular exposure to similar events which 
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we observe in ‘constant conjunction’ that our mind formulates an ‘internal impression’ which we 
call the ‘cause necessitating effect’. Hume succinctly states these ideas in the Treatise, as follows:
Let men be once fully persuaded of these two principles, that there is nothing in any 
object, considered in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion 
beyond it; and, that even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of 
objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those 
of which we have had experience.35
The first principle is that no singular instance can convey anything beyond it. If we then 
choose to form an aggregate, we must imply a notion of similarity, which is an idealization. Thus, 
Hume follows up with his second principle which is essentially a pluralized version of his first 
principle; that there is no good reason to believe that an aggregate can tell us anything beyond 
itself either. Once an aggregate of ‘similar’ instances is perceived, the mind is carried to an
induction – this is yet another idealization. 
Hume presents two more notions which are extremely pertinent to our current discussion. 
Hume tells us that we can add to our understanding of how observed instances affect the 
formation of ideas and degrees on belief if we take into consideration ‘the effects of contiguity, 
as well as of resemblance’36. Observed similarity in separate instances (resemblance) and 
temporal proximity and/or sequencing (contiguity) result from a posteriori cognitive/heuristic 
processes. These ‘two relations of resemblance and contiguity, are to be considered as
associating principles of thought, and as capable of conveying the imagination from one idea to 
another’37. Resemblance and contiguity are two elements which are at the base of pattern 
formation in the mind. When a heightened degree of regularity is observed, the resemblance and 
contiguity of these observations combine to form the idea of causality or ‘necessary connexion’.
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Richard von Mises, a proponent of the frequentist interpretation of probability refers to 
‘resemblance’ and ‘contiguity’ as ‘collective’ and ‘frequency’ respectively. When regularity is 
observed in less-than-constant conjunction, as in the case of stochastic phenomena, resemblance 
and contiguity combine to form the idea of empirical probability. Causality and its counter-part, 
empirical probability, are both idealizations just as the notions of their aggregates, ‘similarity’ 
and ‘collective’ respectively, are both idealizations. Causality arises on one end and objective 
probability arises on the other – both of which arise from the tendencies of the mind in dealing 
with resemblance and contiguity. The mind is led to conceive of these with additional force and 
vigor by means of the associating principles; resemblance and contiguity. Resemblance and 
contiguity represent nothing other than regularity. When the mind is faced with this regularity, it 
is veritably programmed to grasp at something like causality.
Hume still needs to give an account of why he looks both ways before crossing the street. 
Having witnessed such events in constant conjunction in the past, he will not admit a ‘necessary
connexion’ but he still feel that these events are conjoined. It is for this reason he requires 
probability. As Hacking puts it ‘Hume needs a theory of probability in which conjunctions, 
though regular, are less than constant’38. Hume says,
It is the constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of the mind, 
which constitutes a physical necessity: and the removal of these is the same thing 
with chance. As objects must either be conjoined or not, and as the mind must 
either be determined or not to pass from one object to another, it is impossible to 
admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity.39
Just as the mind is determined to ascribe a higher degree of belief to more favorable 
outcomes, it is also capable of ascribing ‘law-like’ necessity between objects which seem 
regularly conjoined. Both of these tendencies arise out of the operation of the same cognitive 
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mechanism. The belief in physical necessity can be understood as the zenith of the gambler’s 
fallacy. Furthermore, Hume states that either chance or absolute necessity, and nothing in 
between, constitutes the manner in which events unfold. The problem of induction that Hume 
lays against causal necessity applies equally to chance.
The error in reasoning in a ‘hasty induction’ is tantamount to the error made in the 
gambler’s fallacy. The only difference is that in the latter it refers to a ‘hasty induction’ in a 
probabilistic system of mutually independent outcomes while the former need not necessarily be 
dealing with probabilities. There is no doubt that Hume’s problem of induction which he lays 
against ‘necessary connexion’ stems from his previous treatment of chances. Hume did not 
formulate it in a probabilistic manner as he could not bring himself to switch to another
conceptual mind frame as Hacking suggests. Had he formulated his attack on causality in 
probabilistic terms, the argument would have essentially remained the same. The problem arises 
when events that are less-than-constantly conjoined are taken as necessarily conjoined. This is
where the propensity to evoke the gambler’s fallacy becomes problematic in a practical sense.
Consequently, this notion of law-like necessity which arises out of the mind has the effect 
of amplifying the very mental mechanism which brought it about to begin with. That is to say, 
the notion of causality leads one to commit the gambler’s fallacy more often than one would 
without it. One’s propensity to commit the gambler’s fallacy increases as a result of the idea of 
causality; itself being a consequence of that fallacy. In other words, we have a sort of iterated 
function between the application of the gambler’s fallacy and the unwarranted ideas it generates.
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Hume also points out this iteration ‘as belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our 
passions, so the passions in their turn are very favorable to belief’40.
Just as causality cannot be inferred from a single observation, neither can the probability 
value of the occurrence be inferred. Upon making several observation of an event, we gradually 
form ideas about causality or chance based on the relative results observed. Thus it gradually 
becomes apparently that both causality and probability are heuristic or epistemic tool which we 
utilized to sift through our experience to help us arrive at coherent and useful picture of the 
world. Furthermore, as true empiricists, we must admit that there is nothing in these instances of 
observation which would suggest that our schematic picture of the world, whether causal or 
probabilistic, has any reality in its own right beyond its epistemic utility. This unwarranted move 
from an epistemic schema of the world, to a metaphysical belief of how the world really is; this 
is what Hume warning of us. The probabilistic paradigm and the causal paradigm are equally 
coherent in describing our world and equal in epistemic utility, but equally nonsensical in 
metaphysical terms for lack of any empirical basis. Having done away with causality, our use of 
the word ‘law’ in speaking of ‘laws of nature’ should rightly be interpreted as a figure of speech.
4 - Philosophy of Probability: Seeking Certainty in Uncertainty
The promise of certain knowledge through a causal paradigm has been undermined by 
exposing the lack of an empirical basis behind such ideas as ‘necessary connexion’. Denying an
empirical foundation for causality does not, in and of itself, provide any reason to believe that 
probabilistic paradigm holds true. As we cannot say anything certain in positive or causal terms, 
an examination of probability is necessitated to exhaust any attempt of saying anything with 
regards to certainty in negative or probabilistic terms. As a coin is tossed through the air, one
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cannot know with certainty which facet will turn up, but can one at least know with certainty the 
probability of either of these facets turning up? The probability of heads is 50/50. Declarations of 
this nature will become ever more ambiguous in the course of this examination of probability.
The interpretations of probability presented in this section can generally be categorized 
into two kinds; the epistemic kind that regards probability as a component of human knowledge 
and acts as a measure of our subjective ignorance of the ‘true causes’ of events, and the empirical 
kind which takes probability to be an inherent ingredient of an indeterminate world.
Probability is, in Hacking’s words “Janus-faced. On one side it is statistical, concerning 
itself with stochastic laws of chance processes. On the other side it is epistemological, dedicated 
to assessing reason by degrees of belief in propositions quite devoid of statistical background”41.
The epistemic approach will include the so-called ‘classical interpretation’ of probability as 
formulated by Pierre Simon de Laplace as well as the ‘subjective interpretation’ and ‘logical 
interpretation’ of probability. In these interpretations, probability pertains to human knowledge 
rather than stochastic phenomena, and with the exception of the logical interpretation, probability 
reflects degrees of belief which are evaluated based on available information. The empirical 
approach will include the ‘frequentist interpretation’ of probability as well as Popper’s 
‘propensity interpretation’ of probability. The proponents of these interpretations understand
stochastic phenomena and probability to be objective.
Let us reconsider this question - Is probability objective or subjective? As the ball spins 
round and round the roulette wheel, is it possible to predict, if I were capable of processing all 
the implicated parameters, the final position of this ball on the roulette wheel? In other words, is 
the final position of this ball causally determined? If this is the case, then probability is simply a 
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measure of one’s subjective ignorance of, or one’s inability to compute in time, the true causes. 
If this is so, then the final position of the ball is knowable, with total certainty, beforehand
(knowable even from start of our universe). Or, as this ball spins around the roulette table, is its 
final position on the wheel truly unpredictable, with the uncertainty surrounding its final position 
being the result of ‘chance mechanics’, chaotic microscopic stochastic phenomena and quantum 
mechanics? In other words, is the final position of this ball indeterminable? If this is the case, 
then probability is an objective feature of a random and truly indeterminate universe. If this is so, 
then the final position of the ball is unknowable beforehand. 
The mathematical side of probability, the probability calculus, functions independent of
philosophical side which is concerned with the interpretation of probability. For our purposes, it
is the philosophical side that will interest us. As the mathematical side is essentially independent 
of the philosophical side, it will only be mentioned briefly.
4.1 - The Mathematical Side of Probability
The axiomatization for the mathematical properties of probability functions was laid out 
by Andreï Kolmogorov in 1933 and is regarded as the standard calculus of probabilities. By 
formulating such axioms, Kolmogorov cleaved the mathematical properties of probability from 
its application or philosophical interpretation. In doing so, he was able to formulate his axioms in 
such a way that they would not depend on, and would apply regardless of, the interpretation of 
probability one uses. This way, he was not burdened with the task of providing a philosophical 
interpretation of his own. He tells us that,
The theory of probability, as a mathematical discipline, can and should be 
developed from axioms in exactly the same way as Geometry and Algebra…
independent of the usual concrete meaning of these elements and their 
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relationships… Every axiomatic (abstract) theory admits, as is well known, of an 
unlimited number of concrete interpretations besides those from which it was 
derived.42  
In theories of physics, we may use the concept of time, or mass, without need to 
simultaneously provide a philosophical interpretation of either of these. Just as our intuitive 
conception of space is divorced from geometry, so too, Kolmogorov insists that the probability 
calculus must be formulated without needing to provide either a philosophical interpretation of 
probability or a method for determining prior probabilities. It is important that ‘the mathematical 
features of probability be kept separate from its applications and the foundational and 
philosophical issues connected with it’ as this makes it possible to have ‘an autonomous field of 
enquiry, specifically concerned with the philosophical aspects of probability, involving in the 
first place its interpretation’43.
To understand how the mathematical and philosophical sides of probability differ, it is 
necessary to make a distinction between primitive probabilities and complex probabilities. 
Primitive probabilities refer to simple or ‘atomic’ events as is the case with assertions such as 
‘the next coin flip will turn up heads’. Complex probabilities, as expressed in assertions such as 
‘the next coin flip will turn up heads and the subsequent flip will turn up tails’ express the 
probability of an aggregate of simple or ‘atomic’ probabilities. The probability calculus dictates 
the axioms by which we can calculate the probability of complex events, or complex 
probabilities, on the basis of the simple events which constitute this complex event. However, 
the probability calculus is only concerned with complex probabilities and so it does not outline 
how to ascertain or calculate a primitive probability – the probability of a simple event. This is 
where the philosophical side of probability comes into play. Ascertaining the probability of 
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simple events is a philosophical endeavor and the various philosophical interpretations of 
probability are employed to this end. 
It is important to note that the mathematical properties of probability hold true
independently of the philosophical interpretation of probability that we attach to it. “The 
interpretation of probability must be kept separate from its mathematical features…To be sure, 
an interpretation of probability is adequate only if it satisfies the mathematical properties that 
form the content of the so-called ‘probability calculus’”44. Probability may refer to a prediction 
regarding the occurrence of a singular event or a prediction regarding the behavior of a class of 
events (also referred to as a collective). Various philosophical interpretations of probability and 
their methods for calculating initial probabilities are presented with the aim of demonstrating that 
we cannot, with unmitigated certainty, know the probability of an atomic event. Therein lays the 
fundamental uncertainty with regards to probability.
4.2 - The Epistemic Interpretations of Probability: The Classical and the Logical Interpretation
In regards to fortuitous events (or seemingly fortuitous), it appears that some 
interpretations want to keep the Newtonian deterministic worldview alive. The first to propose an 
interpretation of this kind, now known as the ‘classical interpretation’, was the ninetieth century 
mathematician, physicist and astronomer Pierre Simon de Laplace. Laplace was known as ‘the 
Newton of France’ and he put a great deal of importance on the English physicist’s work. His 
own work as an astronomer relied heavily on the mechanics developed by Newton and in 
Newtonian mechanics he saw ‘a fully-fledged paradigm of knowledge, strong enough to 
represent our universe in a true and incontrovertible fashion. A key ingredient of this paradigm is 
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determinism’45. From Laplace’s perspective, enamored by the elegance of Newton’s laws and 
observing constant, unceasing regularity and order in the celestial bodies as an astronomer, any 
seeming irregularity or fortuitous event would not conform to this model of the world. Such 
irregularity must arise from the human intellect alone, which due to its intrinsic limitation would 
make chance appear where there is only order. Thus, probability is taken as an epistemological 
feature of human knowledge as opposed to something objective. This idea is presented in his
Essai philosophique sur les probabilities:
Tous les événements, ceux mêmes qui par leur petitesse, semblent ne pas tenir aux 
grandes lois de la nature, en sont une suite aussi nécessaire que les révolutions du 
Soleil. Dans l’ignorance des liens qui les unissent au système entier de l’univers, on 
les a fait dépendre des causes finales, ou du hasard, suivant qu’ils arrivaient et se 
succédaient avec régularité, ou sans ordre apparent ; mais ces causes imaginaires 
ont été successivement reculées avec les bornes de nos connaissances, et 
disparaissent entièrement devant la saine philosophie, qui ne voit en elles que 
l’expression de l’ignorance où nous sommes des véritables causes.46
Through the application of a sound philosophy, namely determinism and the clock-work 
universe paradigm made possible by classical mechanics, humanity gradually sheds itself of its
uncertainty to degrees of ever greater certainty. Laplace infers that we gradually approach 
absolute God-like knowledge which resides only in certainty. This supreme intelligence 
apprehends the entire causal network through all time:
Une intelligence qui, pour un instant donné, connaîtrait toutes les forces dont la 
nature est animée, et la situation respective des êtres qui la composent, si 
d’ailleurs elle était assez vaste pour soumettre ces données à l’analyse, 
embrasserait dans la même formule les mouvements des plus grands corps de 
l’univers et ceux du plus léger atome : rien ne serait incertain pour elle, et l’avenir 
comme le passé, serait présent à ses yeux.47
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Through human efforts, having been granted a feeble likeness of this intellectual, we 
gradually approach greater levels of perfection in our knowledge. Laplace tells us that all these 
efforts in search for truth lead the mind continually towards this supreme intellect, although it 
will always remain infinitely distant from this intellect. As the bible passage puts it, ‘For now we 
see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even 
as also I am known’48, the idea being that we can get infinitely close to absolute comprehension
of God and still we remain infinitely distant from it. 
The important thing to note here is the underlying belief or fantasy that we may reduce 
our degree of uncertainty to an arbitrarily low level, approaching the limit which is absolute 
knowledge akin to this supreme intellect. This fantasy, as will be mentioned, is decisively ended 
by quantum mechanics. It is precisely this fantasy that Laplace wishes to present.
Laplace’s interpretation of probability, known as the ‘classical interpretation’, necessarily 
reflects this notion of uncertainty as underlying epistemic. Probability becomes a measure of
what is known, and is relative to a body of evidence. The probability value (the real number in 
the interval between 0 and 1 where 0≤ ݌ ≤ 1and where p=1 denotes an event whose occurrence 
is certain and where 0 denotes an impossible occurrence [or seemingly impossible based on 
limited relevant information]), is taken to be the ratio of favorable outcomes to that of all 
possible outcomes. Laplace spells it out as such:
La théorie des hasards consiste à réduire tous les évènements du même genre, à un 
certain nombre de cas également possibles, c’est-à-dire tels que nous soyons 
également indécis sur leur existence, et à déterminer le nombre de cas favorables à 
l’évènement dont on cherche la probabilité. Le rapport de ce nombre à celui de 
tous les cas possibles, est la mesure de cette probabilité qui n’est ainsi qu’une 
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fraction dont le numérateur est le nombre des cas favorables, et dont le 
dénominateur est le nombre de tous les cas possibles.49
Laplace provides a recipe for calculating probabilities in highly symmetric situations in 
which all outcomes are (thought to be) equal or ‘également possibles’ such as either face 
turning up in a coin toss, or of the ball landing on any given number on a roulette wheel. This is 
precisely the same idea as the ‘equiprobability’ previously discussed in Hume’s ideas of 
probability. When there is no information by which we can judge or deem one occurrence to be 
more likely then another, we are to regard their probability of occurrence as equal. This is known 
as the ‘principle of insufficient reason’ or ‘the principle of indifference’ (coined by Keynes).
The underlying theme as we have seen with the ‘classical interpretation’ is that 
probability is a measure of our information pertaining to a given hypothesis. This idea is also 
reflected by John Maynard Keynes, the founder of the logical interpretation of probability, which 
take probability as a branch of logic dealing with arguments which are not conclusive, that is to 
say, neither true nor false. Keynes says, 
The terms certain and probable describes the various degrees of rational belief 
about a proposition which different amounts of knowledge authorize to entertain. 
All propositions are true or false, but the knowledge we have of them depends on 
our circumstances…it is without significance to call a proposition unless we specify 
the knowledge to which we are relating it.50
Between an exposition on the epistemic and empirical interpretations of probability, it 
makes sense to discuss Rudolf Carnap’s interpretation which makes use of both. Carnap sees the 
two interpretations as dealing ‘with two different probability concepts which are both of great 
importance for science. Therefore, the theories are not incompatible, but rather supplement each 
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other’51. The first of these, being the epistemic or logic concept, acts to assess the degree of 
belief of a hypothesis relative to a given body of evidence. The second refers to ‘the relative 
frequency in the long run of one property with respect to another’52. Just as we never know 
causality, all we know is a series of conjoined phenomena, Carnap says that the probability value 
is not known, but what is known is the observed relative frequency of one property with respect 
to another. All we have are separate instances that our mind groups together and out of which we 
infer what is underlying or metaphysical (namely, causality or cause). What is underlying never 
shows itself. We never find probabilities, just as we never find causal nexuses; all we have are 
instances of singular outcomes, which we group together as we deem appropriate.
4.3 - The Advent of Probability in Physics
It was only after Laplace’s death that probability became an essential tool in the 
description of many physical phenomena. It would have been interesting to see how he would 
have defended his deterministic stance in light of these advents in physics. The first of these
advents was the discovery of Brownian motion by botanist Robert Brown in 1928, the same year 
that Laplace died. Brownian motion describes the continuous irregular distribution of plant 
pollen and is now regarded as a general property of all sorts of microscopic particles. Albert 
Einstein later confirmed the existence of atoms through the application of this general property 
of small particles. Even where the stochastic element of all these phenomena are arguably
dismissed as being fundamentally governed by the same physical laws that predicate all physical 
phenomena, one can yet turn to quantum mechanics which, on its own suffices to deliver a heavy 
blow to the deterministic world view. The formulation of quantum theory at the beginning of the 
20th century held that probability was an inherent and non-eliminable feature of the constituents 
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of matter itself. Such phenomena as the kinetic theory of gases and thermodynamics appear to be 
aleatory on account of their complexity (as Poincaré will describe) making it to difficult, from 
our limited vantage point, to analyze these phenomena in detail. One who wishes to argue in 
favor of determinism could state that regardless of their complexity, the underlying laws which 
govern the phenomena have not changed. This argument does not hold for quantum theory as its 
dominion is governed by a radically different set of principles. As Werner Heisenberg tells us,
Quantum theory actually forces us to formulate these laws precisely as statistical 
laws and to depart radically from determinism.53
In quantum mechanics, the physical process of making a measurement has a 
profound effect which cannot be minimized. This interaction, in turn, decisively ends the 
possibility of observing things in an entirely passive manner. The process of observing 
something changes the very thing one is trying to observe; there is a minimum finite 
disturbance which will be caused to any system through measurement. Observables in 
quantum mechanics may not be measured simultaneously and this marks a crucial difference 
with classical mechanics. That is to say, to measure the spin of a given particle will prevent 
a simultaneous measurement of its velocity, and vice versa, thereby making it an 
incompatible observable. The fantasy in classical mechanics that the effect of measurement 
can be infinitely minimized ends with the phenomenon of incompatible observables. This 
simultaneously dispels the fantasy that we may reduce our degree of uncertainty to an 
arbitrarily low level as Laplace has envisioned. With the advent of quantum physics, 
‘uncertainty’ becomes objectively insurmountable.
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4.4 - How to Conceive of Stochastic Phenomena
It is useful to turn to Henri Poincaré’s notions of Instability and Complexity to understand 
what constitutes stochastic or aleatory phenomena. When either of these categorizes a 
phenomenon, the end result is always independent of the initial parameters. 
Poincaré’s notion of Instability can be understood as being synonymous with chaos. In a 
dynamic system, unpredictable macroscopic changes may emerge out of microscopic changes to 
the initial conditions54. This is the case with meteorological phenomena, as discovered Edward 
Lorenz in 1961 – founding modern chaos theory. The famous example of this is the butterfly 
effect – a butterfly flapping its wings in one hemisphere of the planet (microscopic change) may 
result in a hurricane sometime later, in the other hemisphere (macroscopic result). In other words, 
the system (in this case a weather system) is so dynamic and dependent on so many factors that a 
minute change in one variable will, given enough time, completely change the macroscopic 
outlook of the event. Poincaré provides the example of a roulette wheel to illustrate this type of
aleatory phenomena. He asks us to consider the spin we impute onto a roulette wheel and how 
any variation in our muscular impulse will be sufficient to change the angular moment, and 
consequently, the outcome of the spin. Such impulses, he suggests, are so faint that they are 
beyond the capability of any delicate instrument to measure. Therefore, there are minute 
variables that affect the outcome of an event which by virtue of their minuteness, completely 
elude us due to lack of precision in measurement. A slight variation is sufficient to make any 
attempt at calculation useless.
An aleatory event characterized by complexity refers to a system that consists of a vast 
number of simple events which, due to the sheer number, makes computing an outcome with 
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precision unfeasible. An example of this would be the kinetic theory of gases or the batter 
mixing machine that made Sam Rothstein’s blueberry muffin in the opening excerpt from Casino. 
The motion of a singular molecule or a single blueberry may be tracked with ease, but once the 
quantity of these surpasses a certain number, the task of monitor every single one becomes 
increasingly difficult and potential unachievable. Therefore we begin to treat them in aggregates. 
Though they will generally be distributed evenly, a momentary drop in air pressure or a muffin 
devoid of blueberries may occur, just as the balls on a billiard table may all find themselves in 
one corner during the course of play. Poincaré’s own example is that of a well shuffled deck of 
cards. There are so many possible permutations that ‘the final order which results will no longer 
be governed by anything by chance’55.
It is interesting to note that Poincaré takes no stance on the ontological question of 
probability. Yet, regardless of any metaphysical consideration, the uncertain which result from 
the instability and complexity of a given phenomenon is permanent insofar as it exceeds the 
limits of method (scientific method and measurement apparatuses). 
4.5 - The Empirical Interpretations: The Frequentist Interpretation and Propensity Theory
Empirical interpretations view probability not merely as an epistemic tool to describe our 
subjective ignorance, but as an objective feature within an indeterminate world. These are, 
namely, the frequentist interpretation and propensity theory of probability. The first to spell out 
an empirical approach was Robert Leslie Ellis in ‘On the Foundations of the Theory of 
Probabilities’ in 1849. In this essay he lays the foundation for what is now known as the 
frequentist interpretation of probability. He writes:
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For myself, after giving painful degree of attention to the point, I have been unable 
to sever the judgment that one event is more likely to happen than another, or that 
it is to be expected in preference to it, from the belief that on the long run it will 
occur more frequently.56
He wanted to address the consistency of the theory of probability with a ‘sensational 
philosophy’ and so laid the foundation for an empirical approach to probability. As opposed to 
examining singular events in isolation, Ellis views these singular events as pertaining to an 
aggregate, as a member is in long series of similar cases. Thus, on a long series of trails of 
similar kinds, one can expect every possible outcome to recur in a fixed ratio of frequency. Once 
this is done, ‘fortuitous causes disappear’ and what is revealed are the permanent features of 
these similar cases. On the long series of trails, order is seen in the place of randomness. This is 
‘an a priori truth, supplied by the mind itself, which is ever endeavoring to introduce order and 
regularity among the objects of its perception’57. It is noteworthy to point out Ellis’ confidence 
that something certain can be discovered, namely fixed ratios of frequency or occurrence, amidst 
randomness and probability. Probability evaluations are generated by the same mental tendency 
described by Hume; that tendency of the mind which now seeks to introduce order with respect 
to aleatory events as it has done with the similar events upon which it imposed a causal nexus.
In The Logic of Chance, John Venn builds upon Ellis’ notion by further introducing the 
notion of a series of things or event wherein uniformity starts in large numbers. From this, Venn 
brings to light the ideas of a ‘central limit theorem’ and ‘the laws of large numbers’. He says:
As we keep on taking more terms of the series we shall find the proportion still 
fluctuating a little, but its fluctuations will grow less. The proportion, in fact, will 
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gradually approach towards some fixed numerical value, what mathematicians 
term its limit.58
Richard von Mises clarified the theoretical presupposition of the frequentist interpretation 
of probability in Probability, Statistics and Truth. His formulation of probability was calculated 
with reference to mass phenomena or ‘collectives’, to which large numbers of singular but 
uniform events or instances belonged. Phenomena of this nature included such things as ‘games 
of chance’, ‘certain problems relating to mass phenomena’, and ‘certain mechanical and physical 
phenomena’59. A collective is taken to mean ‘a sequence of uniform events or processes that
differ by certain observable attributes’60. Probability refers to the relative frequencies found 
within classes. As a result, to speak of the probability of a single event or instance is meaningless.
He illustrates this via a collective formed by all the throws of a die wherein the resulting dotted 
side forms a singular event (the dotted surface being the distinctive attribute separating possible 
events). Another example he provides is the collective formed by all the molecules in a given 
volume of gas wherein the attribute may be the velocity of a single molecule. Thus a collective 
must come prior to speaking about the probability of any of its given attributes. Having defined 
collective and attribute, he says:
A collective is a mass phenomenon or a repetitive event, or, simply, a long 
sequence of observations for which there are sufficient reasons to believe that the 
relative frequency of the observed attribute would tend to a fixed limit if the 
observations were indefinitely continued. This limit will be called the probability of 
the attribute considered within the given collective.61
If an infinite set of observations were made, our measurements would converge to a fixed 
limit. This limit would represent a particular attribute to arise in a given set or collective. This 
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only, however, is not sufficient to qualify as probabilistic, as what is required in conjunction with 
this is the feature of ‘lawlessness’ dispersion of a given attribute over the collective, namely –
randomness. On this basis, von Mises defines randomness as insensitivity to place selection. The 
distribution - the whole of the probabilities attached to the different attributes of a collective, 
must be found to be random in the before mentioned sense. Thus, the probability of any given 
attribute is the frequency with which that attribute has occurred in past observations of a given 
collective, then the distribution is the hypothesis that that same probability value for that attribute 
will be found in any new collective of the same kind. We should expect the distribution of any 
given attribute to be the same as the distribution of that attribute as far as we have observed it in 
passed instances. Regularity is the expectation that the future will resemble the past.
This formulation of the frequentist interpretation of probability can be applied to physical 
phenomena. Some areas in physics that von Mises feels can be treated with his probabilistic 
formulation include the kinetic theory of gases, Brownian motion, radioactivity and Planck’s 
theory of black-body radiation. This is because these fields operate on ‘chance mechanisms’, 
having the feature of collectives. However, the frequentist interpretation of probability cannot 
deal with quantum mechanics which requires an interpretation can address single-case 
probabilities, as is the case with the famous Schrödinger’s cat. Regardless of this, von Mises was 
an advocate of indeterminism and, like Hume, attacked the notion of causality. He says,
It now appears inevitable that we must abandon another cherished notion that has 
its origin in everyday life and pre-scientific thought and has been elevated to the 
rank of an eternal category of thought by overly zealous philosophers: the naïve 
concept of causality…the principle of causality is subject to change and it will 
adjust itself to the requirements of physics.62
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Lastly, it is worth briefly mentioning Hans Reichenbach who also interpreted probability 
as a notion of frequency. Reichenbach saw science as a continuous scale of probability and 
attached a probabilistic meaning to causality which pioneered what is now referred to as 
‘probabilistic causality’. In this regard he says,
The characterization of the causal laws of nature as strict laws is justified only for 
certain schematizations. When all causal factors are known, then an effect can be 
predicted with certainty; such an idealization would be irrelevant for science, 
without the addition of further assumptions. It is impossible to know all causal 
factors; we can only select a limited number of relevant factors and use them to 
predict future events, but must neglect factors of lesser influence. It is usually 
assumed that the influence of the less important factors is small, and that we can 
therefore predict the future within certain limits of exactness. This formulation is 
inadequate, however, and misses a fundamental point in the epistemological 
situation. Actually, we can only maintain that it is highly probable that future 
events will lie within certain limits of exactness.63
The frequentist interpretation of probability provides an empirical model for quantifying 
uncertainty and yielding probability values. However, the underlying suppositions which form its 
foundation are not exempt from the very uncertainty that they are trying to gauge. Firstly, the 
probability of a given event is assumed to be static and not dynamic. One could just as easily 
envision a probabilistic system whose total possible outcomes change dynamically after every 
singular outcome. Does the impact of the roulette ball on the wheel change the probability of the 
entire system after one single spin? Has the probability changed after several years of usage in a 
popular casino? The microscope change affects the outcome of the system in a chaotic way so 
that one longer simply measures the probability of a given event, but measures that probability in 
conjunction with its propensity to change over time. This illustrates the difficulty of accurately 
assessing probability value by empirical means. At best one arrives at an ever more reliable 
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approximation as the number of total observations increased, but ideally an infinite set would be 
required. This notion of reliability is a statistical notion which is itself based on probability, and 
therefore it is not devoid of uncertainty which can, in turn, be quantized anew.
The frequentists, in an effort to break from the causal paradigm, slowly start sliding down 
the very same slippery slope, except they are sliding the opposite slope. Many of Hume’s 
arguments against causality, namely that of moving from a collection of similar instances, which 
is an idealization in the hope of uncovering a pattern (causality, or in this case – fixed ratios of 
occurrence) is an idealization as well. This is precisely the tendency of the imagination when it is 
faced with resemblance and contiguity. Those who came before them ended up with ungrounded
notions of causality. The frequentists end up with the ungrounded notion of objective probability.
All we have are singular instances, the notion of a series or of similar cases or kinds are 
useful abstractions that we employ to aid our understanding but which do not present themselves 
in nature. Venn admits this. The difficulty of finding a precise value of the empirical probability 
of a given event is that this relies on the idea of an infinite series. With this arises the possibility 
that we may have not measured long enough, or deep enough as infinity always eludes us. A
counter instance to our measurements may be looming in the upcoming trials. In its crude 
approach, the empirical interpretation of probability has, at the very least, the humility to admit 
its own fundamental limitations and thereby regarding uncertainty as absolute. It is this truth 
which all other interpretations of probability are still willing to deny.
4.6 – A Pragmatic Interpretation of Probability: The Subjective Interpretation
The subjective interpretation of probability also takes probability to be a measure of our 
beliefs about the occurrence of hypothetical future events. Bruno De Finetti takes a pragmatic 
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stance, abandoning old metaphysical distinctions of indeterminism and determinism as well as 
notions such as causality and chance. While De Finetti provides an epistemic view of probability, 
he does not defend the determinist world view as does Laplace, nor does he argue for the notion 
of objective probability existing outside of, or independently of, a person’s judgment. De Finetti 
addresses the idea of determinism by stating that either the world is governed by fixed laws –
‘necessary and unchangeable laws exist: natural phenomena are determined by their 
antecedents with absolute accuracy and certainty’. If not, then no such laws exist – ‘Real 
laws do not exist as such; forecasts cannot be certain, but only more or less, and perhaps 
immensely, likely or probable; the so-called natural laws are no more than the expression 
of statistical regularities.’ He says,
By rejecting determinism we must accept completely the second of the two 
propositions that I have stated: then, forecasts will no more be certain, but only 
more or less probable. One might have a probability so large as to be entitled to 
name it practical certainty, but this does not change the fact that it is simply a 
probability. The essential novelty in the scientific method would then be the 
substitution of logic by probability theory; instead of rationalistic science, where 
certainty is deduced from certainty; there would be a probabilistic science, where 
the probable is deduced from the probable. It is not prejudicially necessary to 
renounce determinism for setting up science on these bases; we may confess not to 
be able to foresee an event without saying that forecasting is by itself impossible. 
We may then develop science on this line as 1) acceptable to everybody, either 
renouncing or not renouncing determinism; 2) independent from the causal 
principle, which then becomes totally useless. From the acknowledgement of it 
being useless, to abandon it.64
The idea underlying the subjective interpretation of probability is that two people, 
presented with the same information, may generate different probability evaluations. Thus, the 
same body of knowledge can constitute different evaluations in different subjects. Furthermore, 
we can determine the probability evaluation of a given individual by applying the betting method
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– the probability that an individual ascribes to a given event can be seen in the degree of risk he 
is willing to take for a potential return he deeds worthy. Alternately stated, probability can also 
be measured by proposing a bet to gauge at what odds the individual is willing to place a wager.
A reasonable person would place a bet where the return will be (at least) inversely proportional 
the risk of losing. A fair bet is where the return on his wager is the inverse of his evaluation of 
the probability of the event. The essential ideas of the subjective interpretation of probability can 
be shown via the Monty Hall problem (which is a contemporary variation of Joseph Bertrand’s 
Box Paradox).
The Monty Hall problem runs as follows: Suppose you are on a game show and you are 
given the choice of three doors. Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a 
door, say, Number 1, and the host, who knows what is behind the doors, opens another door, say 
Number 3, which has a goat. He then says to you, “Do you want to switch to Door Number 2?” 
Is it to your advantage to switch your choice?65
Intuitively, most people feel that it would be of no advantage to switch as this is not 
perceived as affecting your chances of winning the car. In actuality, if the car is initially equally 
likely to be behind each door, a player who picks Door 1 and does not switch has a 1 in 3 chance 
of winning the car while a player who picks Door 1 and does switch has a 2 in 3 chance. This is 
the paradox. Contestants who switch double their chances of winning the car. Initially, your 
chances of selecting the winning door are 1 in 3 as the car is equally likely to be behind each 
door. Your chances remain the same as they do not change as a result of one door being opened 
by the host. Therefore, the chance of the remaining door is twice as likely as your door to be the 
winning door.
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For our purposes, we are interested in using this paradox as a means of illustrating the 
idea of subjective probability rather than providing a proof for the paradox. De Finetti defines 
subjective probability as meaning ‘degree of belief (as actually held by someone, on the ground 
of his whole knowledge, experience, information) regarding the truth of a sentence, or event E, 
whose truth or falsity is, for whatever reason, unknown to the person’66. What is known is the 
winning door in the mind of Monty Hall, the game-show host (where p(car) =1). What is 
unknown is the winning door in the mind of the contestant whose probability evaluation depends 
on his knowledge, experience and available relevant information. This is what is meant by 
subjective probability, that probability is not objective or measurable; it is a pragmatic or 
operational tool which enables us to assess our own limited knowledge. Probability is nothing 
more than the odds one would accept when betting on an event - the betting quotient at which he 
would be ready to bet on its occurrence. In this regard, probability need not necessarily be 
expressed quantitatively. 
If the contestant is familiar with problems such as Bertrand’s Box Paradox or with the 
idea of variable change of probability, he might decide to swap doors as this will increase his 
chances of winning. If the contestant is not familiar with either of these, like the vast majority of 
us, when he is presented with the two remaining doors, he will evaluate his chances of winning 
as 1 in 2 regardless of whether or not he swaps doors. Thus far, we have seen three probability 
evaluations for the occurrence, all of which are subjectively formulated and equally valid; Monty 
Hall evaluation is p=1 (where he has unquestioned faith that his stage assistants have set up the 
cars and the goats as planned), the contestant who, ignorant of Bertrand’s box paradox, evaluates 
his door as having a 50% chance of winning and the contestant who, having previously 
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encountered Bertrand’s box paradox, evaluates his door at 33% chance of winning and therefore 
elects to make the switch. 
In this same respect, Émile Borel shows us how the same body of abstract knowledge 
gives rise to different knowledge in two distinct human minds. He provides an example of two 
people at sea who are asking themselves what the probability of rain is. Though both are dealing 
with the same variables (the state of the sky, the wind, and the sea) and the same tools at their 
disposal such as a barometer, their probability evaluations may differ based on their knowledge, 
intelligence and past experience.
Past experience, in the form of previously observed frequencies, also influences our 
subjective evaluation of the probability of a given occurrence. De Finetti allows for a 
convergence between our degrees of belief and previously observed frequencies if we take 
observed frequencies to fit Bayes’ method, where our probabilities are updated in light of new 
relevant data. With this, De Finetti provides mathematical arguments that show our inductive 
habits described by Hume. This shows why we are intuitively inclined to expect that the future
frequency of an occurrence will be similar to frequency observed in the past. De Finetti writes:
No science will permit us say: this fact will come about, it will be thus and so 
because it follows from a certain law, and that law is absolute truth. Still less will it 
lead us to conclude skeptically: the absolute truth does not exist, and so that fact 
might or might not come about. What we can say is this: I foresee that such a fact 
will come about, and that it will happen in such and such a way, because past 
experience and its scientific elaboration by human thought make this forecast 
seem reasonable to me.67
This archaic demand for certainty cannot be satisfied. This is essentially the revolutionary 
approach which Boltzmann adopted in the 19th century. There exists a whole host of natural 
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phenomena which cannot be understood if we demand an account of them in terms of causal 
interaction. It is appealing to grasp at something like probability in an attempt to understand such 
phenomena. Natural phenomena exhibit regularity. This regularity can be understood and 
quantified even when it is characterized by a ‘less-than-constant conjunction’. Air pressure is 
(virtually) always uniformly distributed in a closed environment. A baker is almost always right 
in thinking that the blueberries have been distributed evenly in the mixing of the muffin batter.  
The demand for certain, as undisputed knowledge, eventually leads us to degrees of reliability,
making these stochastic phenomena knowable in a statistical and probabilistic sense. 
A fixed unwavering probability value for a given event is far from indisputable as the 
various interpretations of probability may all yield different results. As a tool that quantifies our 
uncertainty, probability is subject to that same uncertainty it is trying to measure. This is 
especially true for the philosophical interpretation of probability. Any fantasy that we shall 
uncover something solid amidst stochastic processes which will yield, with law-like precision, 
the probability of a given event comes to an end. Though we arrive at a probability evaluation, 
that evaluation is, in turn, submit to a probability evaluation of its own. Just as the domain of 
science may answer to a question, the resulting answer is in turn subject to the very same line of 
inquiry. The task is always incomplete. Alas, all epistemic roads seem to converge towards 
uncertainty.
5 - Concluding Remarks
The world seems to be a two-sided coin with objective probability and indeterminism on 
one face and causality and determinism on the other. In physics, classical mechanics prevails on 
one side and quantum mechanics on the other. Both theories are extremely successful. The first 
enables us to put satellites into orbit and the second enables us to look inside someone’s brain 
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with an MRI without opening their skull. On one side we have classical mechanics that gives rise
to the Newtonian clockwork universe paradigm which carries with it four centuries of 
momentum. On the flipside is quantum mechanics which has not yet elicited a paradigmatic shift 
in the zeitgeist. If we have no reason to favor one over the other, it is a mistake to be a proponent 
of one and not the other. As Ramsey says ‘We suppose chance to be ultimate if we see no hope 
of replacing it by law if we knew enough facts…there is no reason to suppose it is not ultimate’68. 
When something known to us fails to bring about its usual effect, we philosophers, says 
Hume, ‘ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but suppose that some secret causes, in the 
particular structure of parts, have prevented the operation’69. ‘Doubtless when it fails we shall 
seek out some hidden and secret contrary cause’, Hacking reiterates and then goes on to ask, ‘but 
suppose that in reality there is none’70? The whole approach of taking certainty to be knowledge 
of the causal networks between phenomena would be mistaken from the start and much energy 
would have to be spent on constructing elaborate rationalization to account for anomalies. All 
phenomena are rationalized to fit the physical view of a clockwork universe. There is, as a result, 
a rampant reductionism that reduces everything to colliding billiard balls.
We favor the outcomes with greater prevalence and we rationalize, or attempt to account 
to other outcomes. Hume tells us the higher the probability, the more likely we are to form 
beliefs of necessity and to ascribe a law-like property to that outcome. Inversely, the lower the 
chance of an outcome, the greater the likelihood to rationalize or attempt to account for the 
‘discrepancy’ by employing other ‘well-established causes’ (justified by their higher rate of 
occurrence, of course). What results is a constant rationalization of data as we have seen with the 
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Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. It is patently ridiculous to modulate your data to fit the picture of the 
world as generated by an inadequate deterministic paradigm. We are not observing the world as 
we find it; rather we are observing how we think we ought to find it. When we are served a 
muffin devoid of blueberries we instantly assume that there is something wrong with the baker or 
the apprentice as opposed to seeing this muffin as an eventuality of the blueberry muffin making 
process.
It seems evident, after having examined the role of probability in relation to science, that 
science itself will, of its own accord, eventually adopt an entirely probabilistic point of view lest 
it should regress into theology. The idea of prescribed law entered into physics haphazardly from 
the language in use during the époque in which classical physics was formulated. As in the 
language of the church and the state, there was the law of God and the law of the land, so to the 
‘laws’ of nature arouse in similar linguistic fashion. Thus, whenever we speak of ‘laws of nature’ 
we are simply restating figures of speech which need not apply any longer and offer no 
advantage as far as making adequate predictions goes. So long as science does not accustom 
itself entirely to a probabilistic way of seeing things, it will constantly find itself with theological 
baggage. Probability accounts for what has occurred as it has occurred and never feels the need 
to go beyond measurement or appeal to anything else – this is empiricism in its purest and 
simplest form. Probability alone suffices for science.
We know what we know. What we want to know is what we do not know. We want 
certainty. To this end, we employ science. When investigating natural phenomena, especially 
physical phenomena, scientists take determinism for granted. Certainty, having taken on a 
deterministic flavour came to mean something like – absolute knowledge of the causal nexus 
which brought about this event or phenomenon. So strong becomes the desire for certainty of this 
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kind that it fashions the world in its own image. It is a shameful mistake for an empiricist to 
approach the world with unwarranted expectation, wanting to come to know the world as he 
want it to be and not how it actually is. 
When we looked for certainty in the world, in its place all we found was a world of 
uncertainty, in science and in daily life. As our dream for certainty, along with the promise of 
science to deliver it, slips through the cracks of our hands like sand, we begin to see that 
uncertainty is something which cannot be reduced beyond a certain point and can never be 
eliminated. This is seen in quantum mechanics in the abandoning of the fantasy that the adverse 
effect of making a measure can be reduce to an infinitely low value. This has aptly been named 
‘the principle of uncertainty’ by Heisenberg. This recognition of uncertainty lays the ground for 
what Suppes refers to as ‘probabilistic empiricism’, where ‘certainty of knowledge – either in the 
sense of psychological immediacy, in the sense of logical truth, or in the sense of complete 
precision of measurement – is unachievable’71.
The problem, to reiterate the opening question of this presentation, is that the world 
seemed to be causally determinate, and if it is not, then it would seem as though it were governed 
by chance. Simply stated, things are either arranged (causality) or they are not (chance). These 
seem to be the only two logical opinions. It also seems that one of these two opinions for the 
arrangement of things must be the case. We want to ascribe to one of these a metaphysical pre-
eminence. It also seems that unless we raise one of these and proclaiming that this (causality or 
chance) is indeed the state of affairs, until then we seem to not have a proper grasp on things.
To this question ‘What is probability?’ we get no definite answer. Probability is like
many metaphysical concepts such as ‘infinity’ in mathematics (debate concerning infinity as 
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absolute versus potential) or ‘causality’ in the sciences (the debate whether causality is objective 
or if it is simply a tendency of the mind to impose patterns). If one has determinism, 
predictability and causality on one hand and indeterminism, unpredictability and chance in the 
other hand, there is no way to decide which to choose, and to prefer either is a mistake. Neither 
determinism nor indeterminism has an empirical foundation, so to choose between them 
transcends experience72.
Using all the tools at our disposal to the best of our ability, we map out the world as we 
map out a thousand-side die, and we are never really sure of what to think of that lone side that
turns up from time to time. We have found regularity but certainly never certainty. If you admit 
that you have discovered the structure of the die, you leap to a hasty conclusion. If you 
persistently assume that there is, in reality, a definite/absolute structure to this die and that it 
ought to be known with certainty (as though the benefits of knowing for certain far outweigh the 
benefits of knowing approximately) then your curiosity exceeds your capacity. As Reichenbach 
tells us,
The ideal of an absolute truth is … a phantom, unrealizable; certainty is a privilege 
pertaining only to tautologies, namely those propositions which do not convey any 
knowledge.73
If on the other hand, we admit after implementing all the faculties of intelligence 
endowed to us, that we have reached the limit of what is humanly knowable with regards to this 
die/this world, only then have we found the solution. That which remains is a mystery in the true 
sense, as there is uncertainty which cannot be traversed. The solution is seen in the vanishing of 
the problems. That which cannot be spoken of must be passed over in silence as Wittgenstein 
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tells us74. In admitting what we cannot know, we know more than when we mistakenly think we 
do know. On one side of the coin we have causality and on the other we have probability. Both 
seem logically equivalent, and neither of them makes a difference to our ability to predict the 
future. How should we decide between them? Or more importantly, why should we decide 
between them? Probability over causality, at the very least, helps us face uncertainty. It seems 
that nothing perplexes the mind more than regularity of phenomena. Even Hume acknowledges
the idea of an uncaused beginning is a very strange idea to entertain. The mind leaps from one 
theological notion to the next and creates unobservable nexuses to cope with the strangeness of 
regularity. The probabilistic paradigm, if it is no better, at least has the courage to look upon 
regularity as-it-is. Either way, the generative force that transforms what was into what will be, 
that force of nature which ‘loves nothing so much as to change the things which are, and to make 
new things like them’75, is completely beyond the capacity of our faculties to comprehend. 
Uncertainty seems to be a feature of human knowledge which cannot be dispensed with. It forces 
us to come back to the purest adage of philosophy – The only thing I know is that I don’t know, 
the only thing I can be certain of is uncertainty. To console myself, I remember that ‘he is the 
wisest who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing.’76
This branch of philosophy of science gives rise to many questions. Probability is a notion 
that extends into philosophy of statistics and the foundations of mathematics. Furthermore, in 
physics the debate about what place probability should have still remains an interesting question, 
particularly with respect to interpretations of quantum mechanics. It also challenges the 
computer sciences to generate algorithms to output random variables. How random can a random 
number generator really be or how are we to compare pseudo-randomness to ‘true’ randomness? 
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My intention has been to juxtapose the causal paradigm to the probabilistic paradigm. 
The two paradigms are equally useful is describing our experience of the world and yet, both are 
equally meaningless and unfounded as metaphysical schemas. Hume’s texts have proved 
beneficial in attacking causality and presenting a psychological account of how we treat 
probability. This, in turn, has help question the idea of justification and certain within the 
sciences and has led us to conclude the uncertain is a permanent and objective feature of 
knowledge. Hume’s essays mentioned throughout this presentation are of great importance if for
no other reason than that they keep alive our sense of what is possible. In this presentation, I 
have attempted to do the same.
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Excerpt from the movie CASINO (1995)
Extreme close-up of a slot-machine. Four reels with sevens across. Suddenly, the power goes out. 
Lights die down..Machine 'waaaooows' down to a dead stop. Security guards, on their hands and 
knees, are pulling the plugs on the three giant $15,000 progressive machines, as ACE talks to 
DON WARD.
ACE: Four reels, sevens across, three fifteen-thousand-dollar jackpots? Do you have any idea 
what the odds are? 
WARD: Shoot, it's gotta be in the millions, maybe more. 
ACE: Three fuckin' jackpots in twenty minutes? Why didn't you pull the machines? Why didn't 
you call me? 
WARD: Well, it happened so quick. Three guys won. I didn't have a chance to call you. 
ACE: You didn't see the scam? You didn't see what was goin' on? 
WARD: Well, there's no way to determine that, Sam. 
ACE: Yes, there is. An infallible way! They won! 
WARD: Well, it's a casino. People gotta win sometimes. 
ACE: Hey . . . Ward, you're pissin' me off. Now, you're insulting my intelligence. What do you 
think, I'm a fuckin' idiot? You know goddamn well somebody had to get into those machines and 
set those fuckin' reels. The probability on one-four-reel machine is a million and a half to one. 
On three machines in a row, it's in the billions. It cannot happen . . . would not happen, you 
fuckin' momo! What's the matter with you! Didn't you see you were bein' set up on the second 
win?
